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Ending the “Doc Fix”: How Repealing the
Sustainable Growth Rate Could Give Medicare
Beneficiaries Better Access to Primary Care
Through Accountable Care Organizations
Alisha Trotter*
I. INTRODUCTION
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law in 19651
he stated, “No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of
modern medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings they
have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that they might enjoy dignity
in their later years.”2
Prior to Medicare, only about 55 percent of senior citizens in the United
States had health insurance.3 This low number was largely attributed to
seniors having retired and not being eligible to receive care from their
employers.4 Before the 1930s, people primarily paid for health care out of
*

Alisha Trotter is a 2014 JD Candidate at Seattle University School of Law. She was
inspired to write this piece after volunteering at low-income clinics and seeing multiple
disparities within the health care system. Alisha hopes that her article will influence
individuals within health care systems to think of innovative ways to efficiently deliver
high quality care while being cost effective. Alisha would like to thank her friends and
family for their continued and unyielding support, Dean Annette Clark of Seattle
University School of Law for helping her develop her article, and Becca Rausch for
helping her brainstorm ideas for this article. Finally, Alisha would like to thank the staff
of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for their hard work and help in improving this
article.
1
Social Security, Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (1965).
2
HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE 2000: 35 YEARS OF IMPROVING AMERICANS’
HEALTH AND SECURITY, 2 (2000), available at http://media.jsonline.com/documents/M
edicare2000.pdf.
3
See Tom Dowdal, Medicare from the Start to Today, NATIONAL BIPARTISAN
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, http://rs9.loc.gov/medicare/history.htm.
4
See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical
Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148 (1993).
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their own pockets.5 If they could not afford the service or the medicine they
would either not obtain it, or they “paid” for it by sacrificing their financial
health. In the 1930s, the “Blues” plans were the true beginnings of health
insurance as we know it.6 Instead of paying out of pocket, the “Blues” plans
provided pre-paid hospital care and began providing reimbursement for
physician services.7 Like modern insurance, the “Blues” plans covered inhospital surgical care as well as medical services.8 The “Blues” policies
were organized by hospital associations at the state level and offered private
coverage for hospital care.9 Under these plans, anyone could sign up, and
premiums were based on a community rating, which meant everyone paid
the same rate regardless of age, health status, or claims history.10 Once the
plans proved to be viable, ordinary insurers,11 or “commercial” companies,
began to cover medical bills and used underwriting to assess insurability
and set premiums.12 Under both the “Blues” plans and commercial policies,
payments were made retroactively to providers on a fee-for-service basis for
virtually all services deemed medically necessary.13 When providers are
paid on a fee-for-service basis it means that they are paid for each service
performed.14

5

Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History of the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD (Nov. 12,
2012), http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html.
8
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141–42.
9
Id.; Healthcare Crisis History, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/healthcarecrisis/history.htm
(last visited July 1, 2013).
10
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 5, at 141, 143; See Glossary: Community Rating,
HEALTHCARE.GOV https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/community-rating/ (last visited
Feb. 24, 2013).
11
It was mainly life insurance companies that began adopting these practices. Bovbjerg
et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 143.
14
Glossary, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/f/fee.html (last
visited July 1, 2013).
6
7
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These early “Blues” plans, followed by the commercial plans, set the
pattern for health coverage that still dominates US health financing.15
However, during that earlier era, cost problems did not exist because
benefits and payments were at low levels, few people had coverage, and
medical technology did not exist to provide sophisticated care.16 But during
the 1940s and 1950s, the beginnings of price increases were becoming
visible as the proportion of the population with health insurance grew
rapidly.17 In an effort to compete for workers, employers began providing
private health insurance as a fringe benefit to employees, making the cost of
health care less prohibitive.18 Despite the expansion of private health
insurance, many seniors19 were excluded because they were retired and did
not receive health insurance coverage from an employer.20 While the federal
government supplied some health services, it was only to identifiable
“federal” populations like the armed services, veterans, and the Indian
Health Service (operated on reservations)21 which left the poor, the frail,
and the aged to fend for themselves.22 President Johnson’s remarks when he
signed the Medicare Bill23 embodies the vision behind Medicare: expand
15

Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143. The Pierce County Medical Bureau, which
was a pioneer program in Tacoma, Washington now known as Regence BlueShield,
provided the basis for Blues plans existing today. Who We Are, HEALTH CARE SERV.
CORP., http://www.hcsc.com/who_we_are.html (last visited July 1, 2013).
16
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143.
17
Id. at 141, 145, 148. Health plans began to offer broader coverage of services and
higher limits on dollars payable to compensate for medical care becoming more
expensive and elaborate. Id. at 146. Many more medications were available to treat a
range of diseases, which included new vaccines. PBS, supra note 10. Tax subsidies were
also helping to extend health insurance to much of the middle class, and in response to
the increase in those who had insurance, the federal Hill-Burton Act made available
grants to expand and modernize hospital capacity. Id. at 141, 145–46.
18
Id. at 145; PBS, supra note 9.
19
“Those within the Social Security system and past retirement age.” Bovbjerg et al.,
supra note 4, at 148.
20
See id.
21
Id. at 145.
22
See id. at 148.
23
See supra text accompanying note 2.
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high quality medical care to seniors and provide financial protection against
the frequent and sometimes devastating cost of illness.24
Today, Medicare primarily serves as the nation’s health insurance for
elderly citizens ages 65 and older.25 Because many seniors are retired, they
live on a fixed income and dwindling savings.26 By providing health
insurance to seniors, Medicare has helped to reduce poverty as well as
increase life expectancy among the elderly.27 However, Medicare as it was
originally conceptualized is no longer providing adequate health care
coverage for seniors because it is becoming increasingly difficult for seniors
to obtain primary care. Because Medicare reimburses primary care
physicians at a low rate for the medical services they provide, primary care
physicians are unable to afford to treat Medicare patients.28 Many
physicians must consider expenses such as business loans, overhead, and
malpractice insurance when deciding if they can afford to accept Medicare
beneficiaries, and many are finding that they cannot afford to run their
businesses.29 This in turn makes it harder for Medicare beneficiaries to find
primary care physicians.30 An American Medical Association survey found
that overall, 17 percent of physicians restricted the number of Medicare

24

HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 2, at 4.
CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, WHAT IS MEDICARE? 1 (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11306.pdf . Medicare also serves
people who are permanently disabled with end stage renal disease. Id.
26
See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 2, at 2.
27
Id. at 33.
28
See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 91 (2012),
available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar12_Ch04_CORRECTED.pdf; AM.
MED. ASS’N, AMA ONLINE SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS: THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT ON SENIORS ACCESS TO CARE (2010), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/outlook/documents/medicare_survey_results_06
1810.pdf.
29
See Steve Daniels, Doctors Who Take Medicare Scarce, ABC EYEWITNESS NEWS
(May 10, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/abc11_investigates&id
=8656615.
30
See MEDPAC, supra note 28, at 91.
25
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patients in their practice.31 The top two reasons for this are because
Medicare payment rates are too low and the ongoing threat of future
payment cuts makes Medicare an unreliable payer.32 These threats are
especially concerning for primary care physicians, whom the survey found
made up 31 percent, or approximately one third, of physicians who restrict
the number of Medicare patients.33
This is particularly problematic when considering the role of primary
care physicians and their potential for reducing health care costs. Primary
care is associated with prevention of illness and death, as well as
improvement in equitable distribution of health care services.34 An
increasing body of literature shows that primary care physicians are
associated with longer life expectancy and higher patient health ratings as
compared with physicians who specialize in a particular area of medicine.35
Because of the preventative nature of primary care physicians, the ability to
see one regularly is key to reducing patient costs because healthier patients
have fewer complications, thus reducing the need to spend an exorbitant
amount on health care.36 Although specialists are often best qualified to
provide care within their areas of expertise for patients with more advanced
clinical conditions, primary care physicians have been shown to deliver care
similar in quality to that of specialists for certain conditions, such as
diabetes and hypertension, while using fewer resources.37 While many
Medicare patients seek specialists for their ailments, the need for primary
31

AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 28.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Glen Cheng, The National Residency Exchange: A Proposal to Restore Primary Care
in an Age of Microspecialization, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 158, 163 (2012).
35
Id.
36
See Margaret Ann Cross, Spend Money on Healthy People, MANAGED CARE (2004),
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0408/0408.wellpeople.html.
37
M. RENEE ZEREHI, AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, HOW IS A SHORTAGE OF PRIMARY
CARE PHYSICIANS AFFECTING THE QUALITY AND COST OF MEDICAL CARE?: A
COMPREHENSIVE EVIDENCE REVIEW 5 (2008), available at http://www.acponline.org/
advocacy/where_we_stand/policy/primary_shortage.pdf.
32
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care physicians in the Medicare arena is arguably more significant in
improving health outcomes, disease prevention, cost effectiveness, and
coordination of care.38
Care coordination is a function that supports information sharing across
providers, patients, types and levels of service, sites, and time frames.39 The
goal of care coordination is to ensure that patients’ needs and preferences
are achieved, and that care is efficient and of high quality.40 Care
coordination is most needed by persons who have multiple ailments that
cannot be met by a single clinician or clinical organization.41 These
individuals’ conditions are ongoing, the severity of which being subject to
change over time.42 An evidence review by the American College of
Physicians43 found that an increase in one primary care physician per
10,000 people in a state was associated with a reduction in overall spending
of $684 per Medicare beneficiary.44 By comparison, an increase of one
specialist per 10,000 people was estimated to result in an increase in overall
spending of $526 per Medicare beneficiary.45
The value of primary care manifests itself in lower costs as a result of
reduced hospitalization, improved prevention, and better coordination of

38

See Cheng, supra note 34, at 162–63.
SARAH HUDSON SCHOLLE, NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS,
MEANINGFUL MEASURES OF CARE COORDINATION 3(Oct. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/091013p9.pdf.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
The American College of Physicians (ACP) is a national organization of internists
(physician specialists) who apply scientific knowledge and clinical expertise to the
diagnosis, treatment, and compassionate care of adults across the spectrum from health to
complex illness. About ACP: Who We Are, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS,
http://www.acponline.org/about_acp/who_we_are/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). ACP is
the largest medical-specialty organization and the second largest physician led group in
the U.S. Id.
44
Id. at 5.
45
Id.
39
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chronic disease care.46 The importance of access to primary care physicians
is echoed in the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission’s (MedPAC)47
report to Congress, which found that Medicare beneficiaries looking for
primary care physicians had greater difficulty during the two preceding
years.48 MedPAC’s concern is reasonable considering there were 47.5
million people enrolled in Medicare in 2010,49 and by 2030 more than 80
million people will be on Medicare due to retiring baby boomers.50 The
potential for primary care to reduce health care costs should be at the
forefront of health care policy, especially when Medicare spent $549 billion
for items and services in 2011,51 and that amount is likely to increase with
the amount of people projected to be on Medicare.
With the ever-increasing cost of health care, this prospect has fiscal
experts concerned about how Medicare will support all of its beneficiaries.52
These statistics and estimates have forced the government to reexamine its
46

David Kinsman & Jacquelyn Blaser, Primary Care Provides Patients with Better
Outcomes at Lower Cost, Urgent Need to Prevent Shortages of Primary Care Physicians,
AM. COL. OF PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/pressroom/primary_shortage.htm
(last visited July 2, 2013).
47
MedPac is a 17 member independent Congressional agency that advises the U.S.
Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. In addition to advising Congress on
payments to private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in Medicare’s
traditional fee for service program, MedPAC is also tasked with analyzing access to care,
quality of care, and other issues affecting Medicare. The Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, About MedPac, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/about.cfm (last visited
July 2, 2013).
48
MEDPAC, supra note 28, at 91.
49
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0146.pdf.
50
MEDPAC, CONTEXT FOR MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 3–4 (2008), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar08_ch01.pdf. See NY TIMES, Medicare,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/medicare/in
dex.html (last visited July 1, 2013).
51
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Trustees Report & Trust Fund (Apr. 23,
2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/index.html?redirect=/reportstrustfunds/.
52
See David M. Herszenhorn, For Many House Democrats, Cost Is the Concern, NY
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, available at http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/formany-house-democrats-cost-is-the-concern/. See also supra note 50.
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approach to health care financing through the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA).53 Signed into law by President Barack Obama
in 2010,54 the ACA proposed Accountable Care Organizations under the
Medicare Shared Savings Program to address the current problems with
Medicare.55 Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are groups of health
care professionals responsible for the overall care of patients who have
original Medicare (those not in a Medicare Advantage private plan).56
Providers aim to coordinate care for patients and manage chronic disease
with the goal of achieving health care quality goals and outcomes that result
in cost savings.57 Providers who voluntarily meet certain quality criteria are
eligible to share in the cost savings they achieve for the Medicare
program.58
Because ACOs are a shift toward a payment mechanism that emphasizes
quality over volume, they have the potential to serve as a platform for
encouraging primary care providers to continue accepting Medicare
beneficiaries. The problem of primary care physicians not accepting
Medicare patients can be largely attributed to the sustainable growth rate
(SGR).59 The SGR is a component of the formula used to calculate
53

See STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW
HEALTH CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 113 (1st ed. 2010) [hereinafter
LANDMARK].
54
HEALTH CARE REFORM: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS, 2012 1 (Barry R. Furrow et
al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Furrow et al.].
55
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 10, 307,
3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395, 940 (2010) (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395 (2006), by adding § 1899, “Shared Savings Program”); Section 3022;
Furrow et. al, supra note 54, at 210.
56
Shining a Light on Health Insurance Rate Increases, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., (Dec. 29, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheetsand-FAQs/ratereview.html.
57
Glossary: Accountable Care Organization, HEALTHCARE.GOV, available at
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/accountable-care-organization/.
58
Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 211.
59
ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ & JOE HECK, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENT INNOVATION
ACT OF 2012 1, available at http://heck.house.gov/sites/heck.house.gov/files/Medicare
%20Physician%20Payment%20Innovation%20Act%20Framework.pdf.
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physician payments for providing services to Medicare beneficiaries60 and
contributes to lower reimbursement rates.61 Lower reimbursements are a
result of Medicare expenditures exceeding the SGR formula’s statutory
target.62 If spending exceeds the cumulative spending target for Medicare
expenditures over a certain period, future updates are reduced to bring
spending back in line with the target. Although this article will mostly
discuss the SGR as it affects traditional Medicare, I will also be discussing
the effects of the formula on Medicare Advantage because it affects 27
percent of Medicare beneficiaries (13.1 million individuals) whom are
enrolled in a plan.63
In this article, I propose that repealing the SGR would provide a platform
for ACOs to be implemented as an alternative payment method for
traditional Medicare, and in turn encourage primary care physicians to
continue accepting Medicare beneficiaries. If achieved, primary care
providers would not continually be subject to the drastic payment cuts
caused by the SGR and would be rewarded by sharing in the cost-savings
primary care providers achieve for their role in practicing preventative care
methods. First, I will discuss how Medicare has historically operated;
second, I will discuss the different ways Medicare has tried to control costs
through various payment methods; third, I will describe the characteristics
of ACOs and why they could be used to encourage providers to continue
accepting Medicare beneficiaries; and fourth, I will examine the skepticism
surrounding ACOs.

60

AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICARE AND THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE 6, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/mss/cola_medicare_pres.pdf.
61
See SCHWARTZ & HECK, supra note 59, at 1.
62
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENT UPDATES AND THE
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM (2006), available at http://www.ascrs.org/down
load/gov/Medicare%20Physician%20Payment%20Updates%20and%20the%20Sustainab
le%20Growth%20Rate%20SGR%20System.pdf.
63
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET, (Nov.
30, 2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-16.pdf.
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II. MEDICARE 101
A. The Logistics
Managed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),64
Medicare is divided into four parts: Part A covers hospital insurance; Part B
is supplemental medical insurance;65 Part C, called Medicare Advantage, is
a plan offered by private companies that contract with Medicare to provide
Part A and Part B benefits;66 and Part D offers prescription drug coverage
through insurance companies or other private companies.67 Parts A and B
are considered traditional Medicare.68 All eligible beneficiaries are
automatically enrolled in Part A, and Part B enrollment is optional.69
Part A finances inpatient hospital services, care in a skilled-nursing
facility for continued treatment or rehabilitation after hospitalization, home
health care services, and hospice care for the terminally ill.70 Under Part A,
Medicare pays for all reasonable expenses, minus a deductible amount for
the first 60 days, and then afterwards, a daily coinsurance payment is also
charged.71
Part B pays for physicians’ services and outpatient hospital services,
including emergency room visits, ambulatory surgery, diagnostic tests,
laboratory services, outpatient therapy, occupational-therapy, and durable
64

CMS is a federal agency that runs Medicare and Medicaid. Glossary - C,
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/glossary/c.html (last visited July 2, 2013).
65
John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicare, 327 NEW. ENG. J.
MED. 1467, 1469 (1992), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jay/health_class/Rea
dings/Lecture03/iglehart_medicare.pdf.
66
Medicare Advantage Plans Cover All Medicare Services, MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/medicare-health-plans/what-medicareadvantage-plans-cover.html# (last visited July 2, 2013).
67
How to Get Drug Coverage, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-upchange-plans/get-drug-coverage/get-drug-coverage.html# (last visited July 2, 2013).
68
Patricia Barry, Figuring Out Your Choices, AARP (May 7, 2012),
http://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-04-2011/medicare-choices.html.
69
Iglehart, supra note 65, at 1469.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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medical equipment.72 Generally Part B does not pay for routine physical
examinations, preventative care, or services not related to the treatment of
illness.73 However, provisions in the ACA allow for coverage of some
preventative care services.74 Under Part B, Medicare pays 80 percent of the
approved amount for covered services in excess of an annual deductible.75
B. Funding Medicare
Medicare is funded by two trust funds: the Hospital Insurance trust fund
and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund, both of which
are maintained by the Department of Treasury.76 Though maintained by the
Department of Treasury, the Social Security Act established the Medicare
Board of Trustees to oversee the financial operations of both funds.77 The
board is made up of members that include the Secretary of Treasury, the
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Commissioner of Social Security.78 The Hospital Insurance trust fund,
which itself is funded by payroll taxes from employees and employers,
finances Medicare Part A.79 Medicare Parts B and D are funded by the SMI
trust fund, which is financed primarily through a combination of monthly

72

Id.
Id.
LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 121.
75
Iglehart, supra note 65, at 1467, 1469.
76
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN PPACA (P.L.111-148) 13
(2010), available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File
_id=55a563ed-0be1-4715-9fd3-ad0bf6e9b2bf.
77
THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. AND FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS.
TRUST FUNDS, THE 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE
FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2012.pdf
[hereinafter THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS.].
78
Id.
79
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 76, at 13. Each pays a tax of 1.45 percent on
earnings. Id. Self-employed workers pay 2.9 percent of their net income. THE BDS. OF
TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 10.
73
74
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premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues.80 Parts B and D
are two separate accounts within the SMI trust fund.81
Projections of Medicare costs are highly uncertain due to unknown
scientific advances82 and the feasibility of cost saving measures in the
ACA.83 Expenditures like the continuing growth in the volume and intensity
of services provided per beneficiary, the increasing number of beneficiaries
enrolling in Medicare, and the continuing improvements in life expectancy
all suggest that Medicare costs will continue to increase and put financial
stress on Medicare’s trust funds.84
While the Hospital Insurance fund is projected to be exhausted85 by
2024,86 the SMI Trust fund may have a brighter financial outlook.87 The
SMI trust fund is financed by Medicare beneficiary premiums and general
revenue.88 The Medicare Board of Trustees projects the SMI trust fund will
remain in financial balance in the future due to premiums being set at a
level to meet expected costs each year.89 However, the aging population and
rising health care costs will cause the SMI fund projected costs to grow

80

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 76, at 13.
U.S. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 1 (2009), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/pdf/tr09summary.pdf.
82
THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 2–3.
83
Id. at 46.
84
See id. at 21–22.
85
Medicare Hospital Insurance program is considered insolvent when revenues and trust
fund balances will not cover 100 percent of projected costs. Paul N. Van de Water,
Medicare Is Not “Bankrupt”: Health Reform Has Improved Program’s Financing, CTR.
ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (June 3, 2013), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3532.
86
THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 27.
87
See id. at 45.
88
General revenues include special payments by states, fees on manufacturers, and fees
on importers of brand-name prescription drugs. SOC. SEC. AND MED. BDS. OF TRS., A
SUMMARY
OF
THE
2012
ANNUAL
REPORTS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html; THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS.,
supra note 77, at 45.
89
THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 45.
81
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rapidly, from 2 percent of GDP in 2011 to 4 percent of GDP by 2087.90
Because expenditures have exceeded the statutory target, the SGR would
cause a 31 percent reduction in payments, which the Medicare Board’s
projection assumes.91 As stated before, the SGR requires payments to
providers to be reduced if expenditures exceed a statutory target in order to
move spending back towards the target path.92
Congress, however, prevented this decrease, as it has been doing since
2003, and decided to keep rates unchanged until January 1, 2014.93
Congress acting to delay or “freeze” physician payment rates creates an
artificial projection of how much premiums will be set at in the future.94
Because the SMI fund is projected to make up more of GDP, it suggests that
premiums will increase in order to continue sustaining the SMI fund.95 This
is a problem because it can lead to Medicare beneficiaries not being able to
afford health care due to premiums being too expensive. The fact that the
growth projection is based on a 31 percent reduction in payment rates, but
that rates have not been reduced that low, suggests that premiums will be
significantly higher than anticipated.
C. The “Un”-Sustainable Growth Rate
One of the criticisms of Medicare is its antiquated design.96 Medicare was
designed to look like the old “Blues” plans in that hospital inpatient care,
90

SOC. SEC. AND MED. BDS. OF TRS., supra note 88.
THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 7.
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_id=83.
94
See THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 45–46.
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physician office visits, as well as surgery were covered.97 With this design
comes the retroactive fee-for-service payment method, which rewards
overutilization98 and does not consider the quality of care delivered.99 As
mentioned before, when providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis, it
means they are paid for each service performed.100 A fee-for-service
payment method offers little incentive to discourage delivering unnecessary
services because reimbursements are not based on quality or the impact on
patients’ health.101 However, some providers enjoy this method of payment
because it provides economic and clinical autonomy over the provider’s
practice.102 Being able to establish prices for services and structure their
clinical work at their professional discretion allows providers to exercise
economic and clinical autonomy over their practice.103 While maintaining
autonomy is important, billing on a fee-for-service schedule is part of what
makes our current health care system unsustainable.104
Providers that care for traditional Medicare beneficiaries are paid (or
reimbursed) on a fee-for-service basis.105 Thus, the SGR affects them
because the formula is used to calculate physician payments.106 Medicare
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-forservice/256755/.
97
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See generally Richard A. Culbertson & Philip R. Lee, Medicare and Physician
Autonomy, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 2, 119–20 (1996), available at
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payments for Part B services are made on the basis of a fee schedule that
physicians bill to Medicare.107 In an effort to create a sustainable growth
path for Part B expenditures, the Center for Medicare Services has used the
SGR formula to calculate physician payments for providing services to
Medicare patients.108 Created under The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the
SGR formula was established because of the concern that the Medicare fee
schedule itself would not adequately constrain overall increases in spending
for physicians’ services.109 The SGR is the statutory method for determining
the annual updates to the Medicare physician fee schedule;110 however, it is
not based on actual health care practices.111 The SGR is derived from four
factors: 1) the estimated percentage of changes in physicians’ fees; 2) the
number of fee-for-service beneficiaries; 3) the percentage growth in real
GDP (ten year moving average) per capita; and 4) the changes in laws and
regulations.112 Under the SGR, cumulative Medicare spending on
physicians’ services is supposed to follow a statutory target that depends on
the rates of growth in physicians’ costs, Medicare enrollment, and real gross
domestic product per person.113 If spending in a given year exceeds the
SGR target for that year, then the amounts paid to physicians for each
service provided114 are supposed to be reduced in the following year in
order to move total spending back towards the target path.115
The SGR formula is problematic because it attempts to limit Medicare
spending for physicians’ services by restraining payment rates without
107
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limiting the growth in volume and complexity of services.116 As noted
before, medicine and health care continues to grow in complexity with new
innovations. In general, health care costs reflect increases in the earnings of
health care professionals, growth in the utilization and intensity of services,
and other medical cost inflation.117 Because the sustainable growth rate
greatly underestimates the increase in the volume and complexity of
doctors’ services, the formula requires more severe cuts as each year
passes.118
Since 2003, Congress has stepped in to prevent impending reductions.119
Not surprisingly, this year Congress voted to freeze physician payment rates
at the 2012 payment levels.120 However, these fixes only contribute to
increasing the cost of Medicare because freezing payment rates does not
account for rising health care costs, so the gap continues to grow, and the
potential cuts get larger over time.121 The cost of implementing this year’s
patch, or “doc fix,” is costing nearly a $25.2 billion spread over ten years.122
As a result, doctors cannot afford to accept Medicare beneficiaries because
they are getting paid lower rates in light of expensive costs for providing
care.
D. Medicare Advantage (Part C)
As an alternative to traditional Medicare fee-for-service, Congress made
several policy changes to encourage private plan participation in Medicare
and enrollment growth under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 in an effort
116
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See Neil Waldron, Medicare Payments to Physicians and the Sustainable Growth
Rate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH PLANS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.rmhp.org/blog/201
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to save more money.123 The assumption was that private plans would
operate more efficiently than traditional Medicare.124 Medicare Advantage
(MA) plans receive a capitated payment per beneficiary instead of a fee for
each service, and are considered by federal policymakers as a way of
controlling the growth of health care costs due to the greater incentive to
innovate and use care management techniques.125 Under capitation, a
doctor, medical group, hospital, or integrated health system, receives a
certain flat fee for every month for taking care of an individual enrolled in a
managed health care plan126 regardless of the cost of that individual’s
care.127 Thus, it forces providers to efficiently use services because they are
only allotted a certain amount to spend on a patient per month.128 Capitation
was meant to create incentives for efficiency, cost control, and preventative
care in health care.129 Given that the majority of individuals enrolled in a
health plan will never use health care services within any given month,
capitation arrangements should naturally “balance out” the high utilizers of
123
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125
Id. See Capitation, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/practice-management-center/claims-revenue-cycle/managed-carecontracting/
evaluating-payment-options/capitation.page (last visited July 2, 2013). There is a fee for
service component in some Medicare Advantage plans. Id.; THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE
FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 311.
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health care in health plans with those who use little to no health care every
month.130 Despite the perceived benefits capitation can offer, perverse
incentives can arise when delivering health care. For example, some
providers may withhold care or provide less expensive care in an effort to
save money.131 Also, depending on what the capitated payments are,
payments may not provide enough money to fund the kinds of preventative
services that capitation should theoretically encourage.132 This is probably
why MA plans work for people when they are relatively well, but fall short
of traditional Medicare when patients are sick or disabled.133 Patients with
long-term and chronic conditions are often denied coverage for necessary
care, or their coverage is terminated under Medicare Advantage.134
Another issue with MA is that it costs more than traditional Medicare.135
Currently, Medicare pays MA plans based on a bidding system under which
payments are determined by comparing bid plans that reflect the plans’
estimated costs to a benchmark.136 Plans bidding below the benchmark
receive their bid plus a rebate equal to 75 percent of the difference between
the bid and the benchmark, and plans that bid above the benchmark receive
the benchmark.137 However, plans that bid above the benchmark must
require that each enrollee pay a premium equal to the difference between
the bid and the benchmark.138 While some plans have used the excess
money to offer drug coverage without premiums and extra benefits, such as
vision care and gym memberships, the government pays the MA plans on
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average 113 percent of the regular Medicare rates for doctors, hospitals, and
others.139 As a result, the ACA freezes payments to MA plans for 2011,
causing a $132 billion dollar reduction in payments to MA plans over ten
years.140 While this is seemingly cost effective, Medicare Advantage cuts
could have long lasting effects by discouraging physicians from accepting
Medicare beneficiaries.

III. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
TO ENCOURAGE PROVIDERS TO ACCEPT MEDICARE PATIENTS
A. Fragmented Care vs. Coordinated Care
A common criticism of United States health care is the fragmented nature
of its payment and delivery system.141 This fragmentation is often due to no
single group of participants (physician, hospitals, employers) being
responsible for the patients’ care.142 Many physicians who practice solo or
in groups often do not coordinate care across specialty lines or with
inpatient facilities, which makes providing care extraordinarily
uncoordinated and episodic.143 For example, there will often be multiple
hospitals and health systems in the same city with no ability to
communicate health information across systems, which perpetuates
unnecessary duplication of services.144 Medicare beneficiaries with multiple
chronic conditions account for 93 percent of Medicare fee-for-service
139
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expenditures.145 Because these patients often receive care from multiple
physicians due to their chronic condition, a failure to coordinate care can
often lead to patients not getting the care they need and being subject to
medical mistakes in the course of care.146 One in five Medicare patients
discharged from the hospital is readmitted within 30 days.147 This alarming
statistic illuminates the need for practitioners to position themselves to
communicate treatment options with one another by having access to
patient records and a shared financial interest in making health care work
efficiently.148 The fee-for-service payment structure also helps perpetuate
fragmentation because care coordination within and outside of the practice,
as well as information exchanges, are not rewarded.149 Because
fragmentation can lead to duplication and waste,150 ACOs will aim to
establish groups of service providers and suppliers who work together to
manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.151
Institutions and health care providers interested in forming an ACO will
have considerable flexibility in the structure they assume because ACOs
can be led by physicians in group practices,152 networks of individual
practices, hospitals, or partnerships among these entities and other health
care providers.153 However, ACOs must have an established mechanism for
145
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joint decision-making.154 To qualify, an ACO must agree to be accountable
for the overall care of a group of at least 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries;155
have sufficient participation of primary care physicians; have processes that
promote evidence based medicine;156 report on quality costs; and be capable
of coordinating care among primary care providers, specialists, and
hospitals.157
B. ACO Payment Structure
If ACOs achieve a certain amount of savings under Medicare Parts A and
B per beneficiary assigned to that ACO, then the ACO will qualify for an
annual incentive bonus.158 Medicare would pay a single bundled fee per
patient and, in turn, ACOs would share in any savings that might accrue to
Medicare as a result of not paying for every clinic visit, test, and
procedure.159 A bundled payment is a single payment for all services related
to a treatment or condition that possibly spans multiple providers in
multiple settings.160 This is similar to the capitation method in Medicare
Advantage, but there are safeguards in place to emphasize quality of care
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154
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and discourage corner cutting or denial of care.161 The bundled payment
will be calculated by integrating Medicare payments for hospital inpatient
and outpatient services, physician services, emergency room services, and
post-acute care services.162 While the bundled payment model allows
providers to retain any amount by which the actual cost of care was below
the bundled payment for the episode, it simultaneously requires providers to
assume financial risk for any amount by which the actual cost of care
exceeds the bundled payment amount for the episode.163 Medicare will,
however, continue to pay individual providers and suppliers for specific
items and services under the current Medicare fee-for-service payment
system.164
In light of this reality, CMS finalized both a one-sided model ACO and a
two-sided model ACO.165 Under the one-sided risk model, ACOs are
eligible to share in the savings generated through care coordination but are
not financially responsible for losses that result when the cost of care
exceeds the benchmark level.166 Alternatively, under the two-sided model,
161
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ACOs must assume financial risk for a percentage of the losses that result
when the expenditures for a given beneficiary exceed the benchmark
level.167 The CMS-developed benchmark is based off of estimates of what
total expenditures for Medicare fee-for-service Parts A and B would have
been without the ACO structure, and is updated/re-evaluated every year.168
The two-sided model is designed to incentivize providers within the ACOs
to limit excess use of fee-for-service reimbursements.169
To reward ACOs for sharing in the losses, the law allows participants in
the two-sided model to earn a higher percentage of the cost savings than the
one-sided model.170 Shared savings payments are determined by the ACOs
aggregate quality performance score, which determines the “sharing rate” or
percentage of shared savings the ACO is allowed to retain.171 ACOs must
report on their performance of providing quality care based on 33 quality
metrics established by CMS, which determines their quality performance
score.172 The higher the score, the higher the sharing rate.173 For a one-sided
risk model ACO, the maximum sharing rate is 50 percent, which means the
ACO may share in a maximum of 50 percent of the savings generated
relative to the benchmark, while a two-sided risk model ACO has a sharing
rate of 60 percent.174 Shared savings, however, is limited to a percentage of
the benchmark.175 A one-sided risk model ACO shared savings are capped

167
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at 10 percent of the benchmark, and a two-sided risk model ACO shared
savings are capped at 15 percent of the benchmark.176
Because the two-sided risk model ACOs share in the loss if expenditures
for a given beneficiary exceed the benchmark level, CMS established a
“shared loss rate.”177 This rate is the percentage of actual costs in excess of
the benchmark that must be absorbed by the ACO and is equal to one minus
the ACO’s shared savings rate.178 For example, if a two-sided risk model
ACO’s sharing rate is 45 percent, then its shared loss rate would be 55
percent, which means the ACO would be financially responsible for 55
percent of the excess costs above the benchmark, with the Medicare
program paying for the remainder.179 However, like shared savings, shared
losses are also capped at certain percentages of the benchmark.180 The
maximum shared loss rate is 60 percent.181 In order to prevent shared
savings being awarded for random variation182 in health care spending on
Medicare beneficiaries as opposed to actual care coordination, ACOs must
meet a minimum level of savings relative to the benchmarks before
participating in shared savings known as the minimum savings rate.183
C. Providing ACOs With a Platform: Repealing the Sustainable Growth
Rate & Encouraging ACO Participation
As it stands, the current trajectory of Medicare spending is unsustainable,
largely due to the SGR and low reimbursement rates.184 Because the SGR
176
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formula is used to calculate physician payments for providing services to
Medicare beneficiaries, providers who are reimbursed on a fee-for-service
basis are affected by the formula.185 Low reimbursement rates affect the
number of Medicare beneficiaries a primary care provider is able to take
care of.186 If payment rates are too low, then providers cannot afford to take
care of Medicare beneficiaries. In light of this reality, access to primary care
is becoming increasingly difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to obtain. The
current payment approach penalizes physicians who control or reduce
volume because they are unfairly subject to payment reductions in an effort
to align with statutory targets.187 Fee-for-service payments reward
overutilization by encouraging clinicians to compensate for insufficient
Medicare payments.188 Because providers get paid a fee per service, the
impetus to bill unnecessarily for services in order to recoup costs not
covered by Medicare’s low reimbursements is tempting. The current
payment system perpetuates fragmentation and inefficiencies by not taking
into account volume, complexity of services, or rewards for coordinating
care.189
Repealing the SGR formula would allow ACOs to become a viable
alternative payment method to fee-for-service190 and could encourage
providers to continue accepting Medicare beneficiaries. Given the potential
to share in the savings along with an underlying fee-for-service payment
structure within, ACOs could encourage providers to voluntarily opt in.
However, failing to repeal the SGR could cause providers to reluctantly
participate in ACOs despite the cost sharing incentive. The SGR is a
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component in determining updates in the fee-for-service payment method.
Because there is a fee-for-service component that underlies the ACO
payment structure, the SGR could influence the Medicare reimbursement
rates within the ACO fee-for-service payment structure. Because the SGR
formula is designed to restrain payments if expenditures exceed a statutory
target,191 the shared savings generated through cost containment efforts in
the ACO could be off-set by the continued payment rate reductions.
Therefore, instituting a new way to update physician payments that apply to
the underlying fee-for-service payments within ACOs could make ACOs
more successful in getting providers to participate. CMS is currently
engaged in a number of initiatives to test new health care delivery and
payment models intended to reduce costs while improving quality.192
Until the SGR is repealed, ACOs could act to limit the perverse
incentives that fee-for-service has developed as well as entice providers to
participate in ACOs. Offering an underlying fee-for-service method could
ease providers’ concerns about not getting paid for their services under both
a one-sided and two-sided ACO model. Additionally, economic and clinical
autonomy that were enjoyed under a fee-for-service arrangement are
encouraged under an ACO. Not only can providers establish their fees, but
the law requires that 75 percent of the ACOs’ governing body be held by
ACO participants.193 Having this structure is important because it prevents
insurance companies from using payment mechanisms to influence how
providers practice.194 An ACO’s physicians decide together, with
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information on patient utilization and guidelines on physician performance,
how best to manage their patients.195
Collaboration within ACOs is key to sharing in the cost savings because
the savings amount is based on a group quality performance score.196 Unlike
the sustainable growth rate which does not reward care coordination or
quality, ACOs reward quality by cost sharing.197 For those providers who
are risk averse, having the option of the one-sided model in which ACOs
only share in the gains could ease providers’ hesitance to participate in an
ACO. A one-sided model allows those ACOs with less experience in risk
models to gain experience in management before sharing in the losses.198
However, under the one-sided model there could be potential problems in
overutilization because ACOs would not share in the losses, and thus not be
held financially accountable for their choices.199 An underlying fee-forservice method could frustrate the goal of containing volume because of the
temptation to increase payments by billing per service.200 While it seems
this same issue could arise under the two-sided model, it is less likely to
happen because the ACO bears the responsibility of covering unnecessary
costs.201 Although an ACO is sharing in the losses, it is subject to a higher
savings rate, which means it is eligible to earn more money for meeting
quality metrics. Additionally, losses are capped at a certain percentage of
the benchmark, which can help ACOs with its risk management.
Although financially incentivizing providers to curb costs has its benefits,
it can have its drawbacks. Therefore, financial incentives should be used
195
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with care so as not to counteract the concerns of incentives undermining
providers’ professional ethos.202 While financial incentives typically employ
a mode of self-interest, implementing performance rankings that are openly
discussed within group settings can be highly effective in counteracting
self-interest.203 Counteracting self-interest within group settings works
because it fosters a collaborative environment where colleagues can learn
from each other–for example, when data on variation in health outcomes or
utilization of resources causes physicians to reexamine their care.204
Although ACOs provide financial incentives, their structure fosters a
collaborative environment in that the financial incentive is based off of a
group quality performance score.205
This type of arrangement would not only hold providers accountable for
their care decisions, but would also be better for the patients because they
are receiving a holistic approach to their care. Collaboration on patient
treatment would make designing a care plan for a patient better. Providers
would be able to understand and review the interactions that the patient has
had with other providers and analyze which treatments have worked and
which have not. The ability of ACO participants to work toward the
common goal of providing care206 and to reap the financial rewards
outweigh the payment inequities perpetuated by the sustainable growth rate,
with respect to primary care as opposed to specialists.207 The favorable
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payment structure within the ACO could encourage primary care providers
to opt in and be financially capable of accepting Medicare beneficiaries.
While some providers and suppliers prefer Medicare Advantage for a
risk-sharing model because of its predictable income,208 cost shifting to
Medicare beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums is still a potential
risk in adopting this model. If the bids are above the standard benchmark,
then each enrollee pays a premium equal to the difference between the bid
and the benchmark;209 if payments from Medicare are too low, providers
can make up for the lack of payment in higher premiums. The propensity to
cost-shift in order to make up for the lack of Medicare funds can have
detrimental effects on Medicare beneficiaries. This is particularly
concerning in light of how access to health care for seniors may be limited
by increases to Medicare premiums.
The SGR also perpetuates cost-shifting in private Medicare Advantage
Plans.210 A key factor in determining the payment rate is Medicare
Advantage’s growth percentage, which is influenced by the sustainable
growth rate.211 The benchmark that the Medicare Advantage plans base
their bids off of incorporates the SGR formula.212 Because the plans are
presumably attempting to stay under the benchmark to obtain more funding,
provider payment can be negatively affected by the SGR.213
http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where_we_stand/assets/sustainable_growth_rate_res
ponse_2012.pdf.
208
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Given the perverse incentives that capitation can bring in an effort to save
money, the sustainable growth rate reinforces this behavior because low
payment rates encourage providers to withhold care to save money. The
effects of the SGR are prevalent in both Medicare’s private plan and
traditional Medicare. Repealing the SGR would encourage primary care
providers to look to new payment methods, like ACOs, so providers can
afford to treat Medicare beneficiaries.
While repealing the SGR formula could counteract the impetus to cost
shift in order to make up for low reimbursement, the perverse incentives of
capitation still linger. Although the bundled payment method used in ACOs
could be compared to capitation, stark differences remain.214 Unlike straight
capitation, where individual physicians take on the financial risk, ACOs are
taking on the risk, which again reiterates the emphasis on a collaborative
effort to drive down costs.215 Furthermore, ACOs have quality metrics that
could act to limit perverse incentives to withhold care in an effort to save
money because ACOs must report and meet the quality standards to share in
the savings.216 Sharing in the cost savings would incentivize providers and
suppliers to work together to achieve a high quality score by identifying
new issues for improvement. For example, an ACO model, in which an
insurance company and medical group are working together, have reduced
the cost of caring for 40,000 members in the California Public Employees’
retirement system by identifying and reducing overutilization of specific
services (i.e. unnecessary tests or treatments) and hospital readmission
rates.217 After a year, this kind of collaboration saved them more than $15
million. This type of structure allows physicians to decide together how best
214
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to implement guidelines and manage their patients.218 The potential for cost
savings and collaboration among providers not only holds providers
accountable for their care, but also could encourage primary care physicians
to accept Medicare beneficiaries because they would not have to worry
about the threat of low reimbursement rates from the SGR because the
savings from the cost sharing would be given. However, if the sustainable
growth rate could negatively affect the underlying fee-for-service payments,
it may disincentivize providers from participating in an ACO.
D. Moving From the SGR to ACOs: What New Problems Will There Be?
While there is much skepticism about ACOs, probably the most
controversial aspect of ACOs is the potential to be anticompetitive.219 Many
health care economists fear the race to form ACOs could result in hospital
mergers and provider consolidation.220 As hospitals position themselves to
become integrated systems, many are working together and purchasing
physician practices, leaving fewer independent hospitals and doctors.221
Greater market share gives these health systems more leverage in
negotiations with insurers, which can drive up health costs.222 Providers
enjoying market power can use their bargaining leverage to command
substantial increases in reimbursement from private health insurers and
insulate themselves from the pressures to accept change in payment.223 This
raises a number of antitrust concerns, in particular that ACOs run the risk of
price fixing if they engage in joint price negotiations, especially in rural

218

Id.
Greaney, supra note 143, at 3.
220
Jenny Gold, ACO is the Hottest Three-Letter Word in Health Care, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/january/13/acoaccountable-care-organization-faq.aspx.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Greaney, supra note 143, at 17.
219

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 1 • 2013

277

278 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

markets.224 There is also a risk that any reduction in Medicare expenditures
will be shifted to payors in the private sector in order to recoup costs or
qualify for the Medicare cost-reduction bonuses.225
While ACOs could accelerate consolidations, consolidating is already a
powerful and pervasive trend.226 According to the consulting firm
Accenture, 39 percent of doctors nationwide are independent, which is
down from 57 percent in 2000.227 An array of new economic realities, from
reduced Medicare reimbursements to higher technology costs, is driving
consolidation in health care and transforming the practice of medicine.228
Because the sustainable growth rate can be attributed to low reimbursement
rates, it suggests that the sustainable growth rate is playing a part in driving
consolidation.229 As stated before, many providers can no longer afford to
accept Medicare beneficiaries because of the low reimbursement rate, and
teaming up with another practice may be a way for providers to still
continue caring for Medicare beneficiaries.
While there are valid concerns about the potential of ACOs shifting costs
to the private sector of health care, the low reimbursement rates suggest that
the sustainable growth rate is also aiding in cost shifting. If payments are
too low, providers could make up the difference by increasing prices to the
private payers. While it is evident that the sustainable growth rate needs to
be fixed, repealing it comes with the heavy price tag of $138 billion
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according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).230 However,
continuing to freeze payments and perpetuating the lack of access to
primary care physicians for Medicare beneficiaries is going to be no less
expensive or beneficial as time goes on.231 Currently, a bipartisan bill232
called the Medicare Physician Payment Innovation Act of 2013 proposed to
repeal the sustainable growth rate233 and is forcing democrats and
republicans to work together to come up with a way to pay for the repeal.234
The hope is that the savings generated from repealing the sustainable
growth rate will help to offset (over time) the initial cost of repealing it.235
Repealing the sustainable growth rate could help to decrease cost shifting to
the private sector and may also encourage providers to remain independent.
Many policy experts praise the shift away from independent practices
because it makes health care less fragmented.236 Although this is true, it is
also important to preserve independent and small group practices to avoid
providers with too much market share controlling prices. Implementing
adequate guidelines and maintaining transparency through interagency
cooperation between CMS and antitrust agencies would help curb the
anticompetitive effects that ACOs with dominant market power may have
on the private market.237 In conjunction with the issuance of the final
230
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regulations for ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Plan,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued a joint
statement of an antitrust enforcement policy regarding ACOs’ participation
in the plan.238 The Final Statement addresses the criteria ACOs qualifying
for the Shared Savings Plan must meet to be considered sufficiently
integrated239 to engage in joint price negotiations with commercial health
plans without being liable for violations of the Sherman Act.240
Because the level of integration determines whether or not an ACO can
engage in collective price negotiations,241 it is important for both the
antitrust agencies and CMS to work together to monitor ACO behavior. In
an effort to reduce uncertainty and encourage ACO development, the
antitrust agencies have elected to defer to CMS on issues concerning
clinical integration.242 While some commentators have criticized the
agencies for ceding their responsibility for monitoring competition in
private markets to CMS, in this instance it is appropriate given the
uncertainty in evaluating different cases that may arise, and also to work
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with CMS to encourage entry into ACOs.243 Although both agencies have
different regulatory goals in that CMS is concerned with overseeing quality
and performance of Medicare and the antitrust agencies are concerned with
consumer protection in supervising dominant market participants,244
working together to deter anticompetitive effects helps encourage affordable
care for everyone, not those solely in traditional Medicare. After all,
Medicare Advantage is a private plan that still contracts with Medicare for
services.245 Because greater market share can drive up health costs,246 it
would be in CMS’s interest to not enable ACOs to gain extensive market
share because it would in turn cost more money to provide services to
Medicare beneficiaries. Cost shifting is in no one’s best interest because it
prevents Medicare beneficiaries from receiving access to health care.
Therefore, CMS should be proactive in helping the antitrust agencies
monitor complaints about an ACO’s formation or conduct.
Because ACO participation is voluntary, it is important to ensure antitrust
laws are not so stringent as to discourage participation in ACOs; equally
important is monitoring large consolidations and mergers that could lead to
unequal bargaining power. One way that the Final Statement will monitor
consolidations is by establishing a “safety zone” for certain ACOs.247
ACOs that fall within the safety zone are presumed to be “highly unlikely to
raise significant competitive concerns.”248 In order to fall within the safety
zone, multiple participants of an ACO can provide no more than 30 percent
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of a health care service within the primary service area.249 Because an ACO
that is outside the safety zone may be pro-competitive but also have the
potential to have anticompetitive effects, the Final Statement describes
certain types of conduct that an ACO should avoid to reduce the likelihood
that it will be investigated and found to be anticompetitive.250 Additionally,
the policy statement provides examples of conduct that may raise
competitive concerns and advises ACOs to implement safeguards against
conduct that may facilitate collusion among ACO participants in the sale of
competing services outside of the ACO.251 These guidelines will hopefully
help maintain transparency and curtail anticompetitive behavior.
Another criticism is that ACOs have a negative assumption that “they can
be successful without major changes in doctors’ behavior.”252 For example,
to achieve their cost savings goals providers will need to change some of
their approaches to treating patients through evidence-based protocols,253
whether it be prescribing different medication or deciding whether certain
kinds of surgery are necessary to determine optimal treatment.254 Critics go
on to say, “[s]uch a profound behavioral shift would likely require reeducation and training and even then the result would be uncertain…ACOs
aren’t designed or equipped to transform physician behaviors on the scale
that will be needed.”255 While the result may be uncertain, this assumption
is flawed because ACOs are addressing the need for behavioral changes by
structuring themselves to allow for a quality performance score based on
249
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quality metrics. Because behavioral changes in the way providers deliver
care is likely to require training and more education, ACOs should
implement some form of continuing education classes for providers and
suppliers within ACOs so that they have clear expectations of how to meet
quality metrics and also aid in fostering a collective accountable
environment. Implicit in the quality metrics and emphasis on coordinated
care is the positive assumption that providers must change their behavior by
being more conscious about how they deliver care in order to share in the
cost savings.

IV. CONCLUSION
Though not perfect, ACOs offer promising steps toward high quality
efficient care for Medicare beneficiaries. While the amount of money ACOs
will actually save is debatable, studies show that integrated delivery systems
and multi-specialty care provide more preventative services and have, on
average, better quality indicators.256 The SGR formula is having an effect
on payment rates, which is perpetuating concerns as to whether Medicare
will be financially sustained once baby boomers retire and whether they will
have access to primary care physicians. As discussed before, primary care
physicians have a positive effect on patient outcomes and can save money
in the long run. But in order to encourage more individuals to choose
primary care as a career, there needs to be financial incentives. The solution
to this problem is repealing the sustainable growth rate and adopting
alternative payment methods, like ACOs. ACOs encourage collaboration
and also offer financial incentives for delivering high quality care. Despite
the potential for ACOs to be anticompetitive, the guidelines in place act to
curb some of the worries of ACOs having too much market share.
Furthermore, there is room for interagency collaboration between CMS and
the antitrust agencies to monitor complaints and ACO conduct. At the end,
256
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it comes down to a collaborative effort from providers, suppliers, and
agencies to address the Medicare dilemma and ensure that the more than 80
million projected to be on Medicare by 2030 receive high quality, efficient
care.
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